Abstract
Introduction
Micro-loans, or relatively small-sized loans, are intended for members of society who are poor or of low income. The micro-loans aimed at enabling them to increase earnings through improvement in productivity, thus reducing poverty. The Indonesian government has stipulated the types of institutions legally permitted to provide micro-loan services through Law Number 1 of the year 2013 on microfinance institutions. This Law defines a micro-loans institution as one that offers micro-scale savings and expenditure services for the public, expands job opportunities, and acts as an instrument of distribution and improvement of public income, as well as improving welfare in poor and low-income families. Micro-loans, therefore, has the characteristics of being user-friendly and having low transaction cost.
Indonesia has varying types of microfinance institutions offering microloan services that broadly classified into three categories: the formal institutions consisting of banks and non-banks, the semi-formal, and the informal microfinance institutions. Laws Number 10 of year 1998 and Number 23 of year 1999 on Banking in Indonesia stipulate the Indonesian Central Bank's authority to classify micro finance institutions into two types: bank and nonbank institutions. Banks that can issue micro-loans are private banks, state-owned Regional Development Banks, domestic private banks, foreign and mixed-ownership banks, and the Community Loans Banks. As for the non-banking institutions, they consist of cooperatives, savings and loans units, village loans institutions, Islamic microfinance institutions (called the BMT or Baitul Mal wat Tanwil), civil society organizations or NGOs, and government programs such as community small business loans, urban poverty alleviation projects, etc.
A study by Kundu (2011) explains the role of microfinance intervention in alleviating poverty in India. According to the survey, the Indian government had started microfinance programs for women in rural areas with a scheme called Swarnajayanti Grameen Swarojgari Yojana (SGSY) through a group/collective loan system (Kundu, 2011) . The loans could be used as work capital to start or develop activities that would provide income and economic stability for the debtors. Customers of a microfinance group periodically save an amount of money in a shared account as the revolving fund that could be used to finance customers' consumption needs and short-term production needs. The empirical finding supported by Robinson (2002) , Cospetake (2002) , Shahidur (2005) , Weele and Weele (2007) , Kai and Hamori (2009), Shirazi and Khan (Winter, 2009 ), Tadeschi and Karlan (2010) , Leikem (2012) , and Clement and Terande (2012) , who prove that microfinance programs could effectively improve income and reduce poverty. According to Osotimehin and Babatunde (2011) , one of the factors influencing microfinance target attainment among the poor in society is the magnitude of the loan. Another finding is an indication that microfinance target attainment powered by the real degree of effective loans, the average loan size, the loan cost, the degree of loan repayment, and the salary paid to employees. Another study by Abiola (2011) uses the binary logit regression model to prove the impact of microfinance by analyzing independent variables consisting of earnings, business location, entrepreneurship, and gender. Also in support of this finding is Afrin et al (2010) , Emeka and Noruwa (2012) , and AsadEjaz and Ramzan (2012) ; who posit that, in principle, microfinance cannot only lower the level of poverty but also develop entrepreneurship.
Furthermore, several empirical studies observe that a recurring problem in the microloan market in developing countries is the high degree of asymmetric information. This issue in turn leads to the risk of moral hazard in the form of loan misuse or repeated loans (multiple loans for a singular purpose), that could potentially increase consumption with no improvement in income. Such a condition would inevitably not reduce poverty in the household. According to Simtowe, et al. (2006) , the moral hazard risk is dominant in microfinance. Their analysis indicates that the microfinance institution could not depend solely on efforts to reduce the risk of moral hazard but should also manage the risk of the repeated loan or multiple loans due to asymmetric information received by debtors. Gine et al (2010) similarly support that the existence of asymmetric information causes the risk of adverse selection; which is more dominant than the risk of moral hazard. Minimizing the risk requires identifying specific features from future debtors; such as their characteristics, business experience, and assets in possession. Contrary to this, Bhinadi (2009) offers a system of scoring loans as an instrument to minimize loan risks.
Nevertheless, there are differences in opinion concerning microfinance about poverty. Husein and Jiwani (2008) posit that the right way to overcome the problem of reducing poverty is still a subject for debate. Mallick (2002) argues that the common views on micro-loans are overly exaggerated and offers findings of considerable negative impacts. Johnson (2004) proves that microfinance tends to make relatively well-off only nearly 50% of the microloan receivers from 1999 to 2003. This issue because the loan product design offered was not flexible, and customers of the institution in question were taking multiple loans and causing loan defaults. Imoisi and Opara (2014) suggest that microloan programs offered by governments have not yet shown any positive impacts on the livelihoods of citizens compared to those provided by private institutions.
Using the discussion above as a foundation, we can see that previous research on microloans provision as a means to help improve household economic conditions have identified various problems that are of interest for further studies. In the case of Indonesia, it is particularly interesting to examine micro-loans about the intention and purpose of Law Number 1 of the Year 2013. This act is to improve the income and welfare of poor members of society. Could micro-loans offered by both bank and non-bank finance institutions factually help change the condition of households from poor into not poor, or is such a change not only influenced by the micro-loans received but also because of the presence of a control variable affecting it?
Method
The theoretical framework of this research based on the theory presented by Shahidur (2005) . The Double Difference (DD) fixed effects method was used to test the effect of microloans on household welfare. The reason for opting this technique was the unobserved heterogeneity factor found in the year 2000's loans, which were time-invariant and were impossible to capture in independent variables. To make an estimation using the panel regression method, Haussmann test was first conducted, which showed a prob > chi2 value of 0.000, thus < 0.05. With this result, the fixed effects method was deemed more appropriate for this study compared to random effects.
The treatment group (T=1) of this study consists of type 1 and type 2 households that received loans in 2000, while the control group (T=0) : Unobserved characteristics on a household level.
: Unobserved characteristics on a community level.
Result and Discussion
The data analyzed in this study taken from the Indonesian Family Life Surveys ( Table 1 . To convince that the fixed effects (FE) method is more appropriate for this analysis, a Chow test and a Hausman test conducted. The impact of micro-loans in 2000 on the total household income in 2007 measured at 3% difference in income improvement between the treatment group and the control group, but the regression results did not show the change (See Table 2 ). This result confirms a finding by Weele and Weele (2007) who adopted multiple linear regression methods to conclude that use of micro-credits in Honduras could increase income when spent on investments. Also, Waheed (2009) also established that micro-credits for longterm investments such as cattle farming and purchase of agricultural tools could significantly increase household income in Pakistan. Table 3 ). However, the analysis on the impact of micro-loans in 2000 on assets in 2007 indicates no significant influence. Table 4 ). The researcher presumes that the impact was relatively small so that it was not seen during regression. Meanwhile, the increase occurring in the treatment group is even lower in level compared to that of the control group, proven by a negative coefficient of -0.02; although the difference is not significant. It is in line with the previous table showing that the increase in the treatment group was lower compared to that of the control group. (Table 5 ). The researcher presumes that the impact was relatively small so that it not seen during regression. Meanwhile, the increase happening to the treatment group even lower compared to that of the control group. food consumption expenditures at between 13% until 19% in the period of 2000 to 2007, but regression results did not show it and even showed a negative coefficient (Table 6 ). The researcher presumes that the impact was relatively small so that it was not shown during regression. Meanwhile, the increase in the treatment group was lower compared to that of the control group. Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Analysis on the impact of micro-loans in 2000 on PCE in 2007 indicates an increase in PCE amounted to 17% in control households. The number shows growth in PCE for both treatment and control households with a difference amounting to 2%. Results of regression analysis on the impact of micro-loans on PCE shows an increase in household PCE of around 17 to 19% during the period of 2000 to 2007. But, the regression results did not show the change and even showed a negative coefficient (Table 7) . Meanwhile, the increase in the treatment group was also lower compared to that of the control group. The findings of this research have proven that micro-loans have real effects on the increase in income, asset value, food and non-food consumption levels, and household per capita expenditures. Although these results differ from other studies in that they provide evidence on the relatively small effects of micro-loans, they are not factually different. Another proof is the change in household conditions in the treatment group. This result means there is an indication of moral hazard from debtors. In line with the findings of Simtowe et al. (2006) , moral hazard can lead to behavior change in debtors. In this study, the moral hazard variable is significant in income, which also proves an increase of income after receiving micro-loans. Shahidur (2005) 
Conclusion
Based on results obtained from the double difference (DD) analysis method, the impact of micro-loans on income change is proven to be unnoticeable and even comes out as a negative in coefficient. An increase occurs in total income with a coefficient of nominal values, but in real value terms the coefficient is not significant, it is negative. Moreover, about the impact of microloans on household asset value, an increase occurs in both nominal and real ways. The effect of micro-loans on total income is not significant. In treatment households, the impact was even lower in degree compared to that of control households. The impact of micro-loans on total consumption expenditures proves to have undergone no noticeable change in both nominal and real values. About these findings, the change in the treatment households is lower in degree compared to that of the control households; with an insignificant difference.
There is no noticeable change in the impact of micro-loans on food consumption expenditures. The difference in the treatment households is lower in degree compared to that of the control households. There is also no noticeable change in the impact of micro-loans on non-food consumption expenditures. This result is also the case with a change in the treatment households, being lower in degree compared to that of the control households with an insignificant difference. Debtors exposed to a moral hazard risk that can lead to behavior change after receiving the micro-loans. As a suggested solution, it is essential to implement effective and sustainable monitoring to minimalize this risk.
